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Abstract 
In this intense era of military and defense development in South East Asia, Singapore has emergence as the fastest country 
in the development of military capabilities. The rapid military development that started in 1965 has made Singapore 
become the strongest and finest in military and defense compared to other Southeast Asia nations. Singapore’s decision to 
be independent from Malaysia has forced it to be self-reliant, especially in terms of security and defense. Singapore 
adopted the approach to develop and strengthen its defense and military system after achieving independence in 1965. Its 
increasing economic development in1990 has influenced the military development process and defense system. This 
rapid expansion has made Singapore emergence as the strongest and most advanced in military capabilities country in the 
Southeast Asian region. The offensive defense doctrine practiced such as forward defense, poison shrimp, pre-emptive 
strike and strategic weaponry ownership had raised concerns among leaders in the Southeast Asian countries. At the same 
time, Malaysia has also taken action to speed up its military development, diversifying the defense doctrine including total 
defense, complete military with modern and sophisticated defense equipment. It is speculated as a result of the security 
impact that Malaysia face from Singapore’s military development. Hence, this study tries to elaborate the impact or 
security implications on Malaysia resulting from Singapore’s military development from the Malaysian military 
perspective. 
Keywords: Military Development, Security threat, Regional security, Strategic defense 
1. Introduction  
The history of the Singapore’s military development has essentially been conducted before the separation of Singapore 
from Malaysia in 1965. However many researchers agree that the military development in Singapore has been conducted 
during the British rule. According to Huxley (2000:1-4) the initial Singapore’s military development was aimed to protect 
the British’s autonomy, in which the latter controlled the island of Singapore as the administration centre particularly in 
Southeast Asia. The importance of Singapore as an island port had influenced British to build a defense system as a move 
to protect the island. Since 1927, Singapore has owned system of defense which includes the army, navy and air force. 
Within 1948-1960, Singapore’s military was controlled by two limited battalions, Singapore Infantry Regiment (SIR) and 
the navy force which is under the Malayan Naval Forces (MNF) base in Woodland, Singapore and the air force which is 
known as Malayan Auxiliary Air Forces (MAAF). Yet at that period, these defense forces known as SIR, MNF and 
MAAF are defense forces that were under the authority of the Federation of Malaya. 
Singapore has rapidly developed its military forces since 1965 upon its separation from Malaysia, as an independent 
nation under the leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (Nasibah Harun,2005:17). Realizing that in terms of 
geography condition the nation is small and its defense force is limited, Singapore was forced to rely on British to ensure 
its security through the establishment of Anglo Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA) in 1957 and Five Power Defense 
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Arrangement (FPDA) in 1971 (Chamil Wariya,1989:49; Chin,1983:chapter3&4). During that period Singapore has taken 
the initiative to draft and build its military and defense system. SIR was changed to Ministry of Interior and Defense at the 
end of 1960 and the administration of all three arm forces became Singapore Army (SA), Singapore Navy (SN) and 
Republic Singapore Air Force (RSAF) and placed under one authority called Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). While since 
1970 the Ministry of Defense Singapore (MINDEF Singapore) was established and Ministry of Home Affairs was 
founded to manage the internal affairs (Huxley, 2000:37-40). 
2. Singapore’s Military Development and Defense Process 
The right after independence and due to the human resources scarcity in military forces, Singapore has decided to set up a 
volunteer organization known as People’s Defense Forces in 1966 to strengthen the force of 6 battalion army at that time. 
Singapore also introduced the National Service program base on the national service model applied by Israel in 1967 that 
obligated 18-year-old citizen or permanent resident to join the National Service. As a result, the total force of Singapore's 
military doubled to 12 battalions with the increase of 6 more army battalion from the National Service at the beginning of 
1972 (Yong,2001:286-288). It is a process to make sure Singapore’s objective to form an army of citizen is achieved 
through the national service program. To ensure that the planning and the defense system are well-built, Singapore has 
brought in military experts from Israel, Britain and Sweden to train and help develop its military capabilities since 1965 
(Hussin Mutalib,2001:41). These experts are responsible in providing the training and planning to Singapore’s military 
officers at the military training institute known as Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute . 
During 1965-1975, Singapore implemented the defense doctrine which is defensive through the approach of protecting 
the country from threats using the deterrence system also knows as the doctrine of poison shrimp. This doctrine warns 
enemies not to take any action that can affect Singapore’s security and sovereignty. It depicts the readiness of Singapore 
to act upon enemies who threaten its security and also popular through the phrase: “eat it and you may die” (Mauzy and 
Milne,2002:170). After the United State’s defeat in Vietnam in 1975, Singapore started to practice a defense doctrine 
similar to the defense doctrine of Israel which is more offensive in nature and known as preemptive strike (attack before 
the enemy strikes base on accurate intelligence information) using the air force, land force (amour), landing and mobility. 
Furthermore, Singapore Armed Force (SAF) received help from Israel Defense Force (IDF) who has introduced the 
defense doctrine named forward defense that stresses on the importance of air defense development, total military and 
sustainable defense. At the same time, Singapore has also reinforced its security system by practicing the dependence on 
superpowers policy to make sure Singapore receives support (Tan,1998:458).  
Since 1980, Singapore has made changes in policy and ownership of sophisticated and strategic armaments parallel with 
the doctrine of defense that it has applied. It too is an approach to ensure the safety and considered as the process to 
guarantee Singapore’s survival. During the 1980s, Singapore has possessed modern weaponry such as 270 light tanks and 
Main Battle Tanks (MBT), 720 carrier vehicles and artillery cannons 155mm (land), 26 F-5 battle aircrafts and Skyhawk 
aircrafts, F-16, Bloodhound missile, RBS-70, Rapier, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and Airbone Early Warning system 
type E-2C Hawkeye. Singapore even has successfully produced its own aircraft called Super Skyhawk at the end 1980s. 
Huxley (2000:459) explained, around 1991 Singapore military power is far more establish compare to Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Military development in Singapore during 1990s involved the purchase and ownership of weaponry such as 
light tanks and Main Battle Tanks (MBT), F-16 aircrafts, helicopters, missiles, modern artillery equipment and 
submarines. Singapore's progress in the field of defense has proven its ability to produce Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) 
in 1998, making it the first Southeast Asian country to successfully manufacture an IFV. In 2000, Singapore has already 
diversified its modern defense equipment that was imported from various countries like the United States, Russia, Sweden, 
Israel and France. Among the weaponry that Singapore possess is 12 AH-64 D Apache Longbow helicopters, 20 F-16 
aircrafts and aircrafts with Dassault Aviation Rafale technology.  
Singapore has also ordered as many as 6 Frigate La Fayette ships from France and by year 2004 Singapore is scheduled to 
receive 4 SSK submarine (please refer to the schedule below). Directly this will make Singapore become the strongest and 
the best navy force in Southeast Asia. According to Tan (1998:459), Singapore's strength at this moment is the best 
compared to other countries in Southeast Asia. Mazy and Milne (2002:169) said the rapid development and increase on 
allocation of expenditure has placed Singapore as a Southeast Asian country which owns the best defense and security 
system in the region of Southeast Asia. 
Dibb (1997) stated that a countries RMA process in Southeast Asia is still vague except Singapore’s. This is because since 
1992 Singapore have started envisioning and directing its military to confront the challenges of the 21st century, parallel 
to the development of  current technology. Realizing the current development of technology and world threats, 
Singapore have started to take measures in ensuring that the military moves together with technological development and 
current threat especially when encountering electronic warfare (EW). For example, the widespread usage of electronic 
combat radio in its military operation has directly shown Singapore's seriousness in applying EW during military 
operation activities such as survey, disruption and deception of the enemy (Tan,1998:467).  
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Singapore's seriousness has brought changes in its military RMA and it is visible through the efforts by trying to apply 
technological advancement that completes high technology military. For example the application of C3I's that is to 
Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence in its military with the use of electronics. It is based on the 
military’s need of adaptation and technological advancement that could strengthen national defense and security system. 
The C3I application is especially noticeable through the use of electronic equipment in performing military operations 
including spying or investigating by utilizing the airborne early warning (AEW), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), with 
high tech aircraft surveyor, satellite, ground base radar, use to decide target through computer usage, purchase of aircrafts 
and other high technology defense equipment (Brooke,2004:4-7).  
3. Malaysia’s Concern on Singapore’s Military Development 
This military development has indirectly raised the concern of Singapore’s neighboring countries, Malaysia in particular. 
Singapore military development is seen as a security threat to Malaysia. Rustam A. Sani (1998:23) stressed bilateral 
issues between the two countries such as the issue of water, newspaper, border invasion, territorial claims, racial problem 
and other lingering issues has influenced how Malaysia views the security threats from Singapore. According to Sarimah 
Othman (1998:15), there were reports in the Malaysian press regarding Singapore actions on the bilateral relation with 
Malaysia and has the purpose to create a strategic enemy (Malaysia) to achieve a higher purpose. Mohd Zuki Pileh 
(2003:36) quoted the Malaysia Foreign Minister statement, Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar concerning Singapore's actions 
regarding the bilateral ties:-  
“They (Singapore) want to show when they separated from Malaysia, they were a small and weak country but now they 
have the ability to defeat Malaysia. Therefore, Singapore thinks they are more superior”. 
In the 1990s and 2000, Malaysia has started to modernize its armed force to be ready to face any threats from aggressors. 
Malaysia's Defense Minister, Datuk Sri Najib Tun Razak has stressed that the modernization efforts of Malaysian military 
will focus on mobility, fire power, increase the amount of battleships and possessing the Airbone Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) (Asian Defence Journal, Oktober 2003:16-23). According to Jayasankaran (2002:20) the Malaysian 
military development is Malaysia’s reaction on Singapore rapid military progress. Malaysia has also taken measures in 
acquiring weaponry which are multi-function or defensive and offensive in nature. The purchase of FA-18 Hornet aircraft, 
MIG-29N Fulcrum, Hawk MK108, SU-30MKM, PT-91M tank, Scorpene's submarine, close range missile launcher 
ASTROS II, G5 MK III , Styer portable rifle among others are Malaysia’s military development process to face any 
security threat (Nasibah Harun,2006:3-6; Tempur, July 2003:39-40). Badrul Azhar Rahman (1998) stated that:-  
“Statement of Singapore’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Brig Jen. Lee Hsien Loong, that Malay are not allowed to 
become pilot and hold high rank position in Singapore’s military forces because concerned over their loyalty… indicates 
that Singapore is getting ready for war”. 
Hamdan Hj Abu (2003:10) quoted former Malaysian Prime Minister’s statement Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad relating to 
Singapore's threat on Malaysia’s security:- 
“…there is a country (Singapore) who has declared Malaysia as its battlefield…there is a proud country (Singapore) who 
claimed they have the right to take preemptive strike and forward defense towards our country. We promise if anyone tries 
to invade our country’s independence with action such as preemptive strike or forward defense, they will get what 
westerners call a bloody nose”. 
4. Malaysia’s Security Impact Analysis 
4.1 Security threat 
Singapore’s military development and defense system in its early stage was initially defensive in nature, since 1971 
Singapore has practiced the poison shrimp doctrine. This doctrine perceived as defense doctrine extracted from the Israel's 
doctrine of defense which affirms that Singapore warns any aggressor not to attack them. This doctrine takes into account 
the regional geo-political condition similar to Israel’s position which is surrounded by Arab countries. This doctrine is 
only a warning towards aggressors, however if attacks or threats are thrown at Singapore then the aggressor are forced to 
face Singapore reaction. The emergence of offensive doctrines known as preemptive strike doctrine is Singapore's 
preparation to attack the enemy if the enemy is believed (base on accurate intelligence information) to try and threaten its 
security. Singapore will not attack any country Malaysia in particular, as long as Malaysia does not threaten the security of 
Singapore. This doctrine is categorized as a need to warn the enemy not to invade or attack Singapore. Hence, to 
complement the doctrine of preemptive strike, Singapore has implemented another defense doctrine called forward 
defense whereby the military development and defense must always be advance. This doctrine affects planning and war 
strategy, hence, Singapore would always need to stay ahead in the development of military in terms of physical and non 
physical features.  
According to Arrifin Omar (2007) Singapore will not attack and threaten Malaysia’s national security.  It is due to 
Singapore will take into consideration various aspects, not only from Malaysia’s military aspect but the economical aspect 
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(especially Singapore’s investment in Malaysia and Singapore’s own economy) and the geography of the region in case it 
opts for war. Dent (2001:1-23) stated the survival of Singapore does not solely depend on the power of its military 
capability but also on its economy. As a nation with limited resources, Singapore emphasizes more on its economic 
security that relies heavily on foreign country. Singapore would be forced a pay high price if it opt for war because its 
economic prosperity depend largely from foreign countries, Malaysia in particular. If Singapore attacks or strikes 
Malaysia, then Singapore’s economy and its economy and investment dependence on Malaysia will surely be affected. It 
directly will jeopardize Singapore’s security and survival. In evaluating whether Singapore can cause a threat to Malaysia, 
Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007) stated that:-  
“Singapore is not the main threat of Malaysia’s security and sovereignty. Basically, Singapore is the second-largest 
investor in Malaysia after United States. The total export to Malaysia is believed to be 15.8% from the whole of its total 
export worldwide. The total imports from Malaysia are also significant with a total of 16.8% from all its import. In other 
words, both countries are interdependent of each other. Hence a military conflict on Malaysia will directly affect 
Singapore’s own survival.” 
The concept of total defense that is implemented by Singapore is still insubstantial and will risk Singapore’s ambition to 
react upon Malaysia. The concept of total defense is a doctrine of defense that stresses the use of all assets and resources 
of a nation to increase its ability to face any form of threats, be it domestic or international. Among the evident 
characteristics of total defense implementation is its activation of volunteer defense and security force in any related 
organization. The concept of total defense practiced by Singapore is a concept that is deemed unsuccessful because 
loyalty and nationalism of Singaporeans is believed to be fragile. Singaporeans that are one of the elements of total 
defense prioritize more on economic stability, their own possessions and life. It is different from the total defense concept 
of Malaysia whereby Malaysian are perceived to have high level of loyalty and nationalism (Mohd Zackry Mokhtar, 
2006:38-43). Arrifin Omar (2007) stated that:- 
“As a nation controlled by Chinese, Singapore must take into account the regional countries total population surrounded 
by the Malay Archipelago, if Singapore plans to attack Malaysia. In this context, it is positive that Singapore should not 
take the risked and bear the consequences in case it attacks Malaysia which is majorly populated by Malays.” 
Hence, in the context of survival of both countries during war is different. Here, Malaysia is deemed to survive when a 
war breaks compare to Singapore for the spirits of Singapore citizen patriotism is weak. Therefore, Singapore would not 
adopt a military force approach against Malaysia due to the fact that there is still weakness in its doctrine of defense that it
practices. Assessing from the aspect of its military capabilities, Singapore has assets that are offensive, yet it is 
characterized as merely a need for a country that has insecurity issues. Although Singapore has carried out many operation, 
training and war strategy in the jungle (jungle warfare), yet Singapore emphasize more on its military training performed 
in the city (urban warfare). This means Singapore’s preparation is to defend the nation and not an attack on Malaysia 
which undeniably needs the jungle warfare strategy. Ariffin Omar (2007) said, if a country plans to go for war, the country 
must take into account the geographical aspect and its military ability and compare it to the environment of the battle field. 
This is because the decision to carry out war with no knowledge of the geographical condition would risk the country to 
face immense destruction and defeat. Although there exist several bilateral issues which rises tension between Malaysia 
and Singapore, the issues can be solved at a diplomatic level and not through the use of military force. The issues of water, 
border invasion (air and sea), islands dispute and other issues are issues that can be negotiated through diplomacy. 
According to Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007):- 
“What is apparent is the existence of action reaction approach which often fluctuate the relationship. Historically it is 
evident that both countries have shown that they are prioritizing the method of diplomacy in settling bilateral issues” 
The rapidness of Singapore’s military development is not at threat to Malaysia’s security. This is because the relationship 
of both countries leaders is close and amicable. It must be understood that a decision to go to war or a conflict are in the 
hands of the leader (head of government) of a country. With the good ties among the leaders, it is the pioneer to increase 
confidence and trust in strengthening the relationship between Malaysia and Singapore. Both countries are manifestly 
serious in conducting and implementing measures in building confidence (Confident Building Measures or CBM). CBM 
is viewed from different perspective. Holst and Melander (1977:147) explained the concept of CBM as such, building 
confidence (CBM) involves the notification of credible prove that there exist no perturbing threats. Alford (1981:134) 
also explained CBM as a measures that can explain military actions or objectives, while Borawski (1986:3) describes 
CBM as a management tool to seek a way to control and notify how, when, where and why a military activity will be 
executed. According to Chalmers (1996:161), in Southeast Asia, CBM has started to be recognized since December 1993 
when governments in this region started to implement CBM. He explained that:-  
“It has become imperative that confidence building measures (CBM) be introduced into the region with greater vigor. 
CBM possess a genuine promise for reducing the chances of unintended conflict and for improving the basic quality of a 
region political environment. They basically aim at enhancing transparency between states….CBM also seeks to make 
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explicit military intentions in order to promote confidence by increasing the flow of information to make relations more 
predictable, thereby reducing the chances of conflicts and surprise attacks” . 
The move to build confidence pioneered by the top level has also been conducted at ministerial level and government 
official, either officially or informally  In fact Singapore's readiness in sharing intelligence information since 2001 is an 
act of willingness to foster good relationship both military powers. Basically Singapore’s military development does not 
give any threat to Malaysia’s safety. This is because, since Singapore separation from Malaysia in 1965, there has been no 
security threat on Malaysia. From Malaysia’s military perspective, Singapore is a country that is not classified as a major 
threat. On the other hand, Indonesia and Thailand are believed to be major threats on Malaysia’s security compared to 
Singapore. This is because according to Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007:-  
“If we assess which country has the ability to threaten Malaysia, it is not Singapore but Indonesia. This is because 
historically Malaysia has faced armed confrontations with Indonesia during the era of Sukarno. We should be reminded 
about the vision of a Greater Indonesia that was introduced by Sukarno, symbolizing that Indonesia has had the objective 
and agenda to conquer Malaysia” . 
The perception of this country regarding a threat is based on the history of Malaysia’s confrontations with Indonesia that 
took place in 1963 (Patmanathan, 1980:23). The military was sent to confront Indonesian military attack that landed in 
Johor and was facilitated by Singapore to stop intelligence information to Indonesia in Malaysia (Aelina Surya, 1992:18). 
In fact, according to Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007) this confrontation between Malaysia-Indonesia claimed a 
number of Malaysian troops in Borneo during the effort to protect national security. It is believed to be the sign and 
measurement of Malaysian military of Indonesia’s ability to use its military force upon Malaysia (Tempur, April 2003:24). 
Ariffin Omar (2007) explained that:- 
“Although Singapore is strong in term of economy, political and military power, it is not a country that can easily set out 
a war because Singapore realizes that it is still lacking in terms of nationalism or patriotic spirit. The countries that can 
afford to threaten the security of Malaysia are Indonesia and Thailand.”  
Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007) perceives Indonesia and Thailand as nations that are able to threaten Malaysia’s 
security. This is because Indonesia and Thailand are regarded as unstable states base on the instability of internal politics. 
Internal problems such as poverty, internal rebellion, ethnic conflict, weak government and terrorist issues make Malaysia 
prone to security threat through the spread of these internal problems to Malaysia (Jasbir Singh, 2003:66-68). Indonesia’s 
and Thailand’s weakness and failure to prevent internal problems would provide a direct impact on Malaysia such as the 
excessive immigration into Malaysia, making Malaysia a hide-out and the spread of terrorist activity are all other factors 
that formulate the threats from Indonesia and Thailand (Allan Gyngell,1983:116). The close ties between Malaysia and 
Singapore either from bilateral aspect or through international organizations, has been the pioneering of confidence and 
belief between both countries. The basic principle of ASEAN countries, that is not to intervene, will affect both countries 
to prevent from threatening each other sovereignty and security. Cooperation and agreement spirit emphasize stability of 
the region has become the essence of policy implementation of each country. Hence, any implementation of policy from 
any ASEAN member will take into account the region’s interest. Five Nations Protection Law (FPDA) consisting of 
Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, New Zealand and Australia in 1971 has influenced understanding between countries to 
mutually help each another and can prevent military violence among members (Wariya,1989:79).In conclusion 
Singapore’s military development does not cause security threat to Malaysia. However the issue is why have several 
statements by leaders and scholars questioned that Singapore’s military development can cause security threat to 
Malaysia? 
4.2 Security dilemma 
In explaining the issue on the action of leaders and scholar that perceive Singapore’s military developmental as 
threatening, we need to understand the concept of security. According to Snow (1998:23) the concept of security involves 
the freedom of mind from fear and danger pertaining two aspects: physical and psychological. In other words, security 
does not only exist in a physical form but also non-physical form (security dilemma). According to Nye (2005:38) and 
Mingst (2001:153&288), security dilemma exists when a country adopts to enhance military capability, consequently it 
would affect another country which will perceive the enhancement of military as a form of threat. Directly it would 
encourage the country to adopt the same approach because by increasing the military ability of one country it will raise 
insecurities to other country. If one country develops a military force it would effects directly to another country and 
makes it feel weak. Collin (2000:32-34) said the dilemma phenomenon of security in Southeast Asia is represented in two 
aspects: in the country (inter-state) and between countries (intra-state). One of the aspects that can raise security dilemma 
are conflict border, rapid military development in Southeast Asia such as in Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia 
that had a positive effect on stimulating and created the phenomenon of dilemma security among Southeast Asian 
countries. To ensure Malaysia’s security and sovereignty, Malaysia’s military power has used strategy which involves 
four stages namely detection, survival, strike and control. Each stage has approaches and specific measures. In explaining 
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the impact of dilemma security on Malaysia from Singapore’s military development, Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007) 
explained that:-  
“At this time, we (the military) have detected several signs in Singapore like its rapid military development and problems 
involving Malaysia-Singapore’s bilateral ties. Hence, we (the military) as much as possible would strongly inclined and 
encourage solution through diplomacy. In efforts to face this scenario our strategy (the military) is to strengthen the 
relationship with Singapore so that security threat risk can be eliminated. At the same period we (the military) must 
continue military development planning that was planned by the government to ensure our safety. Malaysian cannot 
avoid security dilemma when our neighboring country Singapore is developing its military power aggressively. Yet the 
existing security dilemma is under control. This is because we ourselves (Malaysia’s military) have our own approach in 
handling this phenomenon”. 
Although the above statements depicts that Malaysia is facing psychological impact (security dilemma), yet it is handled 
through strategy and approach whereby Malaysia’s military especially has enhance confidence building measures (CBM) 
between Malaysia and Singapore. The military’s strategy uses CBM as an approach to eliminate security dilemma and 
threat, through cooperation between both countries and defense force in ensuring confidence and belief between both 
countries that can be strengthened. It is consistent with Malaysia stance as a country that practice and emphasizes on 
peace and constructed relationship policy with neighboring countries, particularly Singapore. In conclusion, military 
development Singapore has a psychological effect (security dilemma) on Malaysia. Yet this effect was handled by 
Malaysia and its military through strategies and approaches that prevented this effect from affecting the relationship 
between both countries. 
4.3 Arms Race 
Klare (1993:136-152) believes that there are scholars trying to prove that the arms race phenomenon in Southeast Asia has 
existed since 1990s and described that after the Cold War (1991), NAT countries competed to obtain modern weapons to 
strengthen their defense system especially in the purchase of defense and weaponry equipment. In fact he observed that 
this phenomenon had made Asia the region that recorded a very high arms trade and if one country’s military development 
process is uncontrollable (abnormal), then it would spur a phenomena of arms race between countries. Buzan (2000: 
88-108) believes that one country’s rapid military development will invite other countries reactions to develop its military 
to establish the balance of power. But does this arms race phenomenon also happen in Malaysia? The development of 
Malaysia’s military force should not be looked as a reaction (arms race) against rapid development of Singapore's military 
force. Malaysia’s military modernization planning was drafted earlier and implemented stage by stage according to the 
national economic position.  
In fact the rapid military development in Malaysia has been conducted since the early 1990s and it is a normal 
development. The purchase of several strategic equipment like battleship KD Jebat and Kasturi in 1992 which at the time 
was the most modern and up-to-date warship in Southeast Asia, is seen as need for Malaysia in ensuring maritime 
sovereignty and security. It is corresponding to the fact that Malaysia is a country whose behave maritime state. Increase 
in assets and the purchase of 4 more Frigat's battle ships (2006) and 2 Scorpene submarines in 2002 conducted by 
Malaysia is not a reaction to counter Singapore’s military capability, whereby at that time Singapore owns 4 submarine 
and warship furnished with missiles (1 Destroyer battle ship called Formidable, 6 corvette warships Victory, 6 boat with 
missiles Sea Wolf, 6 Fearless warship).  
Instead, the purchase of strategic defense equipment in Malaysia is seen as need of one country to make sure the level of 
power and capability of sea defense in Malaysia is ready to face any security threats forms outside. The purchase of two 
submarines which is a strategic equipment of sea defense and a process to make Malaysia have the ownership of 
underwater strategic weapons is to strengthen the maritime defense. According to the Director of Centepis Center UTM, 
Azmi Hasan (2007), the purchase of submarines is not characterized as a weaponry competition against Singapore; 
instead it is process in strengthening the national under water marine defense weaponry. The Air force development in 
Malaysia, through the purchase of 26 MIG 29 aircraft from Russia, 8 FA / 18D Hornet aircraft from US and latest 18 
Sukhoi SU-30MKM aircraft said to be the most sophisticated from Russia, cannot be seen as a phenomenon of arms race 
with Singapore. Malaysian military development process is a step to ascertain that it is able to function as a credible army 
in handling any forms of threat against national sovereignty and interest. Malaysia does not wish to engage in any arm 
race with Singapore and at the same time also don’t want to be left behind in the field of national defense. Arrifin Omar 
(2007) also said :-  
“In terms of sophistication Malaysia has made weaponry purchases and owns up-to-date aircraft enabling to increase 
Malaysia’s strength. Yet in terms of quantity Singapore's has far greater ownership of aircrafts. Hence, arms race 
between Malaysia and Singapore is non-existent”. 
According to Gray (1983) among the features in arms race is the involvement of two or more parties behaving 
aggressively hostile. Parties involved will compete to match one another in term of quantity (army personnel, weapons) or 
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quality (military, weapons, organization, doctrine, location). Arms race phenomenon must possess a continuous increase 
in quantity and quality. The arms race assumption between Singapore Malaysia from the result of Singapore rapid 
development military is not conclusive. This is because military development process in Malaysia is based on plan and the 
planning is perform according to a specific time frame and also base on the countries financial capacity. What is certain is 
that the allocation of Malaysia's defense expenditure, since the country achieved independence in 1957, has never 
exceeded 5 %. This means there is no prove of Malaysia trying to match Singapore expenditure and military power. 
According to Acharya (2001), although there is an increase of defense expenditure allocation among Southeast Asian 
countries after the Cold War, it is only a record of figure increment. One country’s military development is often 
misinterpreted by other country as a potential threat. This is influenced by psychological effect from the military 
development impact of the other country (Acharya,2001:136-141). Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007) stated that:-  
“The development and purchase of our (Malaysian military) strategic and conventional equipment should not be 
considered as arms race. In fact, if we carefully analyze from our purchase of 8 FA-18 aircrafts, this lot is not qualified to 
be a squadron which must consist of 16 aircrafts. So where is the validity of the arms race assumption between Malaysia 
and Singapore? Moreover in terms of submarine purchase, it cannot be concluded as arms race because the purchase of 
2 Scorpene submarines cannot match Singapore who owns 4 so far”.  
Additionally, in his opinion the purchase and development should be viewed as prevention because it is to make 
Singapore aware that Malaysia also has strategic equipment and Malaysia would be able to fight if war would ever erupt 
between both countries. Thus the military development and modernization process in Malaysia currently are process to 
strengthen the existing deterrence system.  
4.4 Deterrence system 
There are raising questions concerning Malaysia’s military development goals and objective that been increasingly active 
since the early 1990s. What are Malaysian military goals and objectives in its development and modernization process? 
Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007) explained that:-  
“The military will continuously be modernized through phases according to its concepts which are deterrence and 
forward defense. At the same time, the development towards the direction of approaches will take into account the need of 
all three forces army, navy and air, to ensure their abilities are more effective.”  
What is deterrence? Deterrence can be defined as a social and political contact especially to enable one party to influence 
the other party. It aims to ensure the enemy or opponent abides to the party who implements deterrence. Kegley and 
Wittkopf (1989:377) said that deterrence is a strategic capability to avoid from being attack by the enemy and it also is a 
move to convince the enemy not to take any action so that war can be prevented. For further explanation, please refer to 
the diagram 1. 
The application of deterrence concept in international relations is to make sure B does not take action or implement a 
policy that could threaten  A’s position.  A will threaten a severe act if B continues its plan of attack and will have to pay 
the consequences. Therefore A's threats are aimed to warn and prevent B’s harmful purpose. This can be concluded that 
the deterrence concept can be a tool of diplomacy, also known as diplomatic bargaining in the international relation arena. 
Threat which is used by a country to its enemy is a psychological tactic without involving the use of physical force that 
can produce. The implementation deterrence system has directly given the enemy an opportunity to weigh and reconsider 
the impact of their policy or strike before taking action.  
Usually a country would not execute an action that is unfavorable to itself. According to Buzan (1987:69), deterrence is a 
strategic capability to avoid any attack from the enemy. In other words, deterrence is a tentative to convince an enemy not 
to initiate a war. In explaining the goal of military development in Malaysia, it should not be considered as Malaysia's a 
preparation to act aggressive upon Singapore. Instead Malaysia is trying to create peace and stability with Singapore 
through the deterrence system. With this system it should influence both countries to weigh on decision of adopting 
military force against each other. Here the statements which were issued by Malaysia’s leader announcing that Malaysia 
will respond to the attack if it was threatened are forms of deterrence approach. Both countries have already built their 
own deterrence system either through development of military physical approach or non physical approach. This system 
has successfully influenced both countries to weigh upon the impact if one launches an attack. The peace and stability 
between Singapore since 1965 until today are influenced by the success of the deterrence system applied by both countries. 
According to Ahmad Ghazali Abu Hassan (2007):- 
“If we compare military and defense capabilities of Malaysia with Singapore, Malaysia is lagging far behind. But with 
the strategic strength, even lacking in number, Malaysia still has succeeded in creating prevention of attack.” 
Additionally he thinks that the deterrence system is not only limited to development of a defense force branch. For 
example Malaysia’s purchase of 2 Scorpene submarine in 2002, although it cannot match the strength of Singapore's 
armada equipped with 4 submarines, it does not mean that Malaysia’s deterrence failed. This is because Malaysia's 
defense concept is not only subjected to the navy but is also a Comprehensive Defense Concept or Total Defense 
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(HANRUH). The concept of total defense involves all forces of security and defense, official public (volunteers force), 
which has given a great impact on Singapore in realize that Malaysia is strategically stronger. With the introduction and 
practice of joint warfare in Malaysia, this can send a message to Singapore not to belittle Malaysia’s military powers. 
Indirectly this is another form of prevention to avoid any threats from Singapore. The military development in Malaysia 
has the purpose to establish a deterrence system for the enemy. It also is the aim of the government in ensuring the system 
and Malaysia's defense equipment is reliable and able to face enemy any threats. It does not aim to present a threat to 
another country, on the contrary it is the country’s obligation in modernizing and upgrading the strength and military 
capabilities of Malaysia (Tempur, Julai 2003:2-5). 
5. Conclusion 
Singapore’s rapid military development has been conducted since 1965 and has raise national security concern among 
Malaysian leaders. The emergence of bilateral issues such as water problem, border conflict and others have been the 
signs in assessing the possibility of threats that Singapore could inflict upon Malaysia. Actually these assumptions are 
irrelevant according to the Malaysian military’s perspective, because it is just viewed as a mere development to fulfill this 
small country’s need. The military development in Singapore doesn’t intend to prepare a war on any country, but it is 
solely a deterrence system. The implementation deterrence system is the best asset for a country in guarantying its 
sovereignty and security without involving in war. Hence, offensive physical and non physical development is 
Singapore’s approach to strengthen its deterrence system. To make sure the deterrence is strong, it has to be made aware 
among regional countries thus vast publicity is needed to convey the message of the deterrence system that is being 
implemented in Singapore. 
Singapore is a small country that is very depended on service oriented economy, apart from trade and port. Singapore's 
shortages of natural and labor resources are elements that influence Singapore’s policy to not be an initiator of triggering 
war. Its economic dependence with Malaysia is also another factor why Singapore would avoid not adopting military 
force and not affect their Malaysia-Singapore relationship. A sour relationship as a result of inflicting military force 
would directly destroy Singapore's economic strength. It is unarguable that the military development in Singapore will 
give psychology implications to Malaysia especially security dilemma. This is because according to the theory security, 
any increase in military development will give implications to other countries and make them feel insecure. This security 
dilemma does not affect Malaysia’s security and sovereignty, Malaysian military has plan a strategy that is to implement 
the confidence building measures (CBM) concept with Singapore. This strategy not only creates good ties among head of 
states but also involves relationship of both countries’ ministries of defense. Sharing intelligence information and 
cooperation among both countries relating to security aspects will eventually affect both countries confidence and belief 
to increase and become stronger. This progress is sure to erase the security dilemma and security threat assumptions.  
The military development in Singapore has actually triggered Malaysia’s awareness to address in modernizing its 
possession of military and defense. The purchase of military and defense equipment either strategic or conventional is 
Malaysia’s action to ensure the system of defense and military are able to face any security and sovereignty threats. 
Malaysia’s military development and modernization is to meet the planning and strategy which are fixed in accordance 
with a particular time span. In fact the purchase of defense equipment lies on the limited financial allocation. Hence, the 
assumption speculating an arms race by Malaysia’s military from the development of Singapore’s is not concluded, 
instead it is merely a development and modernization of both countries defense force. Basically Malaysia’s military 
development and modernization is a process to strengthen the existing deterrence system. This is because, to ensure 
security and sovereignty are secured without launching a war, the implementation and enhancement of this system is the 
finest move. The purchase of modern equipment either conventional or strategic, is an approach that sends a warning to 
the enemy to consider the impact if they launch an attack on Malaysia. 
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Table 1. Singapore’s military Budget 1996-2006 
Source : Altered from The Military Balance 2006, International Institute for Strategic     
               Studies, Routledge, 2006, The Military Balance 2003-2004, International     
               Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2003 dan SIPRI Yearbook 2003,     
               Oxford University Press, New York, 2003. 
Table 2. Comparison of Singapore’s and Malaysia’s military Budget 2004-2006  
Year 2004 2005 2006 
Singapore’s military Budget 5.10 billion (USD) 5.57 billion (USD)  6.16 billion (USD)  
Malaysia’s military Budget 2.25 billion (USD) 2.47 billion (USD) 3.08 billion (USD) 
Source : International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006,  Routledge, 2006. pg 281-283
Year  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Amount 
(Bilion Dolar 
Singapura) 
5.78 6.61 7.47 7.61 7.46 7.721 8.10 8.20 8.62  9.25 10.05 
Amount 
(Bilion Dolar 
US) 
3.88 4.39 4.47 4.47 4.33 4.43 4.67 4.70 5.10  5.57 6.16  
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Table 3. Orders and Purchase of weapons by Singapore between 1998-2002 
Supplier No. Of 
weapons 
Weapon Type of Weapon  Year 
France 1 La Fayette Class Frigate 2000 
 144 Aster-15 SAAM SAM 2001 
Israel 600 Python-4 BVRAAM 1997 
 - Spike-MR/LR Anti-tank missiles 1999 
USA 8 AH-64D Apache Helikopter tempur 1999 
 12 AH-64D Apache Helikopter tempur 2001 
 192 AGM-114K Anti-tank missiles 2001 
 20 AIM-120C AMRAAM Pesawat FGA 2000 
 2 S-70A/UH-60L Helikopter 2000 
 54 M-109 chassis Senapang 2001 
Sweden 4 Challenger class Kapal selam 1995 
Notes :   -  No available information 
Source  : Altered from SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Oxford University Press, New York.              
2003 and The Military Balance 2003-2004, International Institute of Strategic       
Studies, London. 2003
Table 4. Comparison of Singapore’s and Malaysia’s military force base on data and weaponry Army 
Army Singapore Malaysia 
Total 50,000 personnel  80,000 personnel 
Tank (MBT): 100 Centurion (including in Taiwan & Thailand) MBT PT-91 ( 48 are being ordered) 
Medium Tank 350 AMX-13 SM1 26 Scorpion 90 
AIFV 294  AMX-10P 44,AMX-10 PAC 90 and  IFV-25 N.A 
AIFV 294 AMX-10P 44,AMX-10 PAC 90 and IFV-25 N.A 
APC 1,280 ATTC Bronco, IFV-40/50M-113 and M-113A1 1020  APC (T) 347Adnan, Stormer, 
Condor, Panhard and Commando
Artileri 286 missiles105mm and 155mm  37LG1, 8FH- 2000, 
FH-88 and M-114/A1 
414 (Missiles 105mm and 155mm) 
Rockets 30 - 30+Gil/Spike/Milan 18  ASTROS II 
Missiles SAM 75 and MANPAD 75 Mistral/RBS-70/SA 18 SAM  dan MANPAD 48  Anza, SA-18 
and Starburst
Radar AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder none 
Navy 
Navy Singapore Malaysia 
Total 4,000  15,000  
Submarines 4 SSK class 2 Scorpene ( predicted in 2009) 
Battle Ships 7 (Frigat 1 and Korvet 6) equiped with Surface to Air 
Missile (SAM), Missiles 2+140 Harpoon, Surface to 
surface Missile (SSM) RGM-84 C Harpoon and canon 
76mm. 
10 (Frigat 4 and Korvet 6) equipped with 
Surface to air Missile (SAM) Sea Wolf
and Aspide, Surface to Surface 
Missile(SSM) MM-40 Exocet and 
Otomat cannon 76mm 
Boats 17 equiped with Surface to air Missile (SAM), 2 + 140 
Harpoon missiles, Sea Wolf missiles, Surface to surface 
Missile (SSM)  RGM-84 C Harpoon,  SAM Mistral and 
canons 176mm 
17 equiped with  SSM MM 38 Exocet 
and canon  57mm 
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Air Force 
Air Force Singapore Malaysia 
Total 13,500  15,000  
Combat aircraft 111 aircrafts including:F-5 (F-5S Tiger II and 
F-5T Tiger II), F-16 (F-16A, F-16B, F-16C and 
F-16D Fighting Falcon), Super Skyhawk 10 
TA-4SU,RF-5S Tiger, 4E-2 Hawkey
64 aircrafts including:-F-5 (F-5E Tiger
II and F-5F Tiger II), MiG 29N Fulcrum
16 (15 aircrafts),F/A-18 D Hornet (8 
aircrafts),Hawk MK108,SU-30MKM 
(ordering18 aircrafts ) 
Ballistic Missile  Air to Surface Missile (ASM)AGM Shrike,
Maverick, Harpoon and AM Exocet, Air to Air 
Missile (AAM) AIM Sparrow and Sidewinder
Air to Surface Missile (ASM)  AGM 
65-Shrike and Harpoon, Air to Air 
Missile (AAM) AIM Sparrow and 
Sidewinder 
Combat Helicopter  8 AH-64D Apache none 
Helicopter  40 Super Puma, Super D Chinook and Cougar 22 Nuri, Black Hawk and Alouette
UAV aircraft 64 Blue Horizon, Chukar III, Searcher MKII 3 Eagle 150
Source: The Military Balance 2006, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2006. 
Figure 1. Deterrence Concept 
Source: Mohamad Faisol Keling, Mohd Dino Khairi Sharriffuddin and Laila       
Suriya Ahmad Apandi (2006).Theory and Concept of International Relationship and strategic studies. Sintok:UUM 
Publishing
